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This chapter presents the results of a component of the study of the interplay between 
administrative law and governance in East Africa.  
1.1. Objectives of the study  
The general objective of the study was to examine the rule making, implementation and 
adjudication practices of administrative agencies, and evaluate the impact of judicial review on 
public administration, in order to contribute to enhancing the quality of governance in East 
Africa by generating knowledge and recommendations on administrative law and its application. 
In more specific terms, the study sought to determine how administrative agencies in East Africa 
make, apply rules and adjudicate disputes; establish the nature and forms of public participation 
in agency rulemaking, decision making and adjudication process; determine the role and impact 
of judicial review, parliamentary intervention and presidential oversight on the conduct of 
administrative agencies in the delivery of administrative justice; develop pedagogical tools that 
can help improve the capacity of the future generation of lawyers and public administrators in 
the use of administrative law principles; propose policy and legislative interventions that can 
help mainstream the principles and policies of administrative law in the conduct of public 
agencies. 
In order to achieve its objectives, the study set out to answer the following research questions  
 What is the map of administrative agencies?  What are their legal rules and 
constitutional framework? 
 How do administrative agencies make and apply rules and adjudicate disputes?  What 
informs and constrains their decision making?  Where are the decisions formulated  
 To what extent does the public participate in the rule making, rule application and 
adjudication processes of administrative agencies and local authorities? 
 Is the public aware of the rule making, rule application and adjudication processes?  
To what extent does the public use these mechanisms?  How does it perceive them?  
In particular, does the public consider these procedures and mechanisms to be fair 
mechanism for accountability that can contribute to the democratic exercise of 
power? 
 Does judicial review facilitate the democratic and accountable exercise of power by 
administrative agencies and local authorities? How does judicial review transform 
patterns of bureaucratic behavior?  Do administrative agencies obey or implement 
judicial review decisions?  Further, do they review their decision making procedures 
where they have been faulted by courts in judicial review proceedings?  And does 
judicial review have an educative effect? 
 To what extent do other institutions, (Parliament, Executive) processes and practical 
realities influence the democratic and accountable exercise of power? 
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 What interventions can facilitate the democratic accountable exercise of power? What 
are the pedagogical tools that can help improve the capacity of the future generation 
of lawyers and public administrators in the use of administrative law principles?   
   
1.2 A theoretical framework of administrative law and governance 
The study was informed by the rich body of literature that theorises the conceptual and 
instrumental linkages between administrative law and democratic governance. Critical to 
understanding those linkages is an appreciation of the aims of administrative law. There are two 
major competing theories on the fundamental aims of administrative law, which  are often 
categorized into “red light” and “green light” theories.1 The former argue that administrative law 
exists mainly to  restrain state power in order to uphold individual liberty, while the basic view 
of the latter is that the aim of administrative law latter is to facilitate efficient and effective 
public administration which, in turn,  facilitates the attainment of the state’s policy objective.   
As is the case with most theoretical debates, however, the polarisation between the red light and 
green light theorists obscures a more complex reality in which particular administrative law 
regimes are capable of pursuing both aims depending on contextual factors. The experience of 
Malawi is a case in point. Influenced by the historical experience of the country in which the 
one-party dictatorship wielded virtually unlimited power which eroded individual liberties, 
courts have emphasised the need to keep authoritarian state power in check to prevent a repeat of 
the excesses of the past.  At the same time, however, courts have exercised restraint and 
subordinated judicial/legal judgment  to political and bureaucratic judgment on the basis that the 
law must be slow to interfere with administrators’ exercise of discretion, especially in matters 
involving policy judgments.2    
The polarisation between red light and green light theories should also be placed in perspective 
by considering that, if viewed through the conceptual lens of “democratic governance,”  both red 
light and green light theories ultimately  posit democratic governance as the goal of 
administrative law and only differ with respect to emphasis. The former emphasise the liberty 
aspect of democratic governance, while the latter emphasise the preservation of the democratic 
mandate of policymakers, unencumbered by undue legal restrictions.  
Despite the diversity of emphasis, therefore, the literature appears to reflect consensus on the 
broad proposition that the administrative law is to promote democratic governance.3 One critique 
of this view is that, by focusing on  procedural safeguards, administrative law diverts attention 
                                                          
1 See Harlow, Carol, and Richard Rawlings. Law and administration. Cambridge University Press, 2006;  
Adam, and Martin Loughlin. "In Defense of the Political Constitution." (2002): 157-175. 
2 Judge-Lord, Devin. "Why Do Courts Defer to Administrative Agency Judgment?." (2016).  
Almendares, Nicholas, and Patrick Le Bihan. "Increasing leverage: judicial review as a democracy-enhancing 
institution." Quarterly Journal of Political Science 10.3 (2015): 357-390. 
3 Akech, Migai, 2013:  “Globalization, the Rule of (Administrative) Law, and the Realization of Democratic 
Governance in Africa: Realities, Challenges, and Prospects,” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Vol. 20, No. 




from critical substantive problems of governance.4 It is arguable that this critique is predicated on 
an untenable conceptual dichotomization of substance and procedure, and a disregard of empirical 
evidence which proves that, at least in some contexts, systematic and sustained enforcement of 
procedural rules generates substantive political, economic and social changes.5     
Another   debate that informed this study’s understanding of the conceptual and practical 
linkages between administrative law and democratic governance is that which focuses on the 
question whether administrative law principles are grounded in the common law (and are merely 
restated by   constitutions)6 or in  the constitution (with the common law only serving as an 
interpretive tool).7 The doctrinal significance of this debate lies in the fact that if administrative 
law principles are rooted in the constitution, they enjoy more enhanced protection from 
legislative and judicial interference than they would if they existed only in the form of the 
common law or statute. Additionally, if administrative law principles are grounded in the 
constitution, it will be imperative that their interpretation and application   be grounded in the 
broader principles of the constitution such as the rule of law, transparency, accountability, 
separation of powers and equality before the law.  
Finally, the theoretical perspective of the study was also influenced by the view that the linkage 
between administrative law and democratic governance is dynamic and interactive in that  
variations in the form and substance of administrative law produce particular democratic 
governance outcomes and, in a similar vein, particular configurations of the governance terrain 
influence the making, application and adjudication of administrative law. The elements of the 
governance terrain that are identified in the literature as having a direct impact on the 
operationalisation of administrative law principles include  the existence of clear   legal mandates 
of administrative decision-makers, the institutional capacity of the agencies,  their decisional 
independence, the increased technical and specialized character of  administrative decisions,8  the 
persistent centralization of power, citizen’s awareness of , and ability to demand and enforce 
their rights to administrative justice; the  increased participation in public policymaking, the  
existence of  epistemic community, network, and interest groups;9 the sectoral interests of 
particular stakeholder groups;10  and the level of organization of citizen groups.11  A significant 
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5 See Nzunda, Matembo. "The quickening of judicial control of administrative action in Malawi 1992-1994." In 
Phiri, Kings Mbacazwa, and Kenneth R. Ross, eds. Democratization in Malawi: A stocktaking. No. 4. Christian 
Literature Association in Malawi, 1998. 
6 See Lunguzi v Attorney General  
7 This was the view of high Court Justice Mwaungulu in  The State v Blantyre City Assembly, ex.p. Ngwala 
Miscellaneous Civil Application No.183 of 2012. In his own words, to state that section 43 of the Constitution 
merely restates the common law “is not very accurate conceptually”. 
8 Shapiro, Martin, “Administrative Law Unbounded: Reflections on Government and Governance”, Indiana Journal 
of Global Legal Studies 369, 375 (2000-2001).  
9 Ibid. 
10 Berner, Maureen; Amos, Justin and Morse, Ricardo (2011): What Constitutes Effective Citizen Participation in 




part of the study, therefore, examined the presence or absence of these elements and the 
influence of that situation on the prospects of democratic governance in Kenya and Malawi.    
The study further examines the data with respect to the governance outcomes of the current 
practices in the implementation of administrative law principles. In particular, the study focused 
on outcomes that appeared to be reflect the influence of the specificities of Malawi’s and 
Kenya’s political, economic and social conditions. Such outcomes of  the application of 
administrative law included   Finally, the theoretical perspective of the study was also influenced 
by the view that the linkage between administrative law and democratic governance is dynamic 
and interactive in that  variations in the form and substance of administrative law produce 
particular democratic governance outcomes and, in a similar vein, particular configurations of 
the governance terrain influence the making, application and adjudication of administrative law. 
Grounded in this view of  the dynamism and interactivity of the relationship, the study located 
itself in on-going debates related to the nexus between law and governance:    the criminalization 
of informality12, citizens demand for governance, the tension between legality and 
legitimacy/pragmatism, the quality of   participation of citizens (deliberative democracy- 
Habermas), the cause and effect of  legal lacunae, the tensions between technical versus political 
decision-making,13 access to public information and the impact of judicial review on governance. 
1.3 Methodology 
The selection of local government as an arena in which to study administrative rulemaking, rule-
application and adjudication is justifiable by the fact that the constitution and operation of local 
government raises important questions with respect to administrative law theory. The first 
question relates to the legitimacy of administrative authority. While theory posits the authority of 
administrative agencies as being based on the principle of delegation, formal local government 
structures derive theirs directly from the Constitution. The theoretical debates over whether 
administrative agencies are agents or principals, in the legal sense, therefore gain added 
significance in connection to local government .The second defining characteristic of local 
government is the multiplicity of actors and the varying degrees of the  formality of their 
authority. Unlike central government agencies, formal local government administrations interact 
directly with informal community structures, some of which exercise de facto authority which 
significantly affects administrative rulemaking, rule application and adjudication. In that regard, 
local government offers an ideal referent for investigating how the processes and mechanisms of 
rulemaking, rule application and adjudication are shaped by costellations of formal and informal 
institutions and their synoptic interaction.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
11 Hornstein, Donald 2005: Complexity Theory, Adaptation, and Administrative Law, Duke Law Journal, Vol. 54, 
No. 4, Thirty-Fourth Annual Administrative Law Issue: Incrementalism and the Administrative State (Feb., 2005), 
pp. 913-960. 
12 Hayden, Tiana Bakić. " The taste of precarity." Street Food: Culture, Economy, Health and Governance (2014): 
83; Bandauko, Elmond, and Gladys Mandisvika. "Right to the City? An Analysis of the criminalisation of the 
informal sector in Harare, Zimbabwe." Journal of Advocacy, Research and Education, 2015, Vol.(4), Is. 3 (2015). 
13 Shapiro, Sidney A. "The Failure to Understand Expertise in Administrative Law: The Problem and the 
Consequences." Available at SSRN 2720970 (2016); Fisher, Elizabeth C., Pasky Pascual, and Wendy E. Wagner. 
"Rethinking Judicial Review of Expert Agencies." Texas Law Review 93 (2015). 
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The study commenced with    a comprehensive review of all the relevant literature on 
administrative law and governance in Malawi. For this purpose, three main types of 
documentation were identified and reviewed to inform the development of the study’s conceptual 
and theoretical frameworks and the design of research instruments. Documents reviewed 
included statutory and policy documents that set out the rule-making, application and 
adjudication mandates of   administrative agencies sampled for the study; peer reviewed and gray 
academic literature; official and semi-official reports and other documents and  newspaper 
reports.  
 
Literature review was followed by key informant interviews which targeted a purposively 
selected sample of officials of district,  city and municipal councils; elected local government 
representatives;  officers of civil society organisations and other citizen’s voluntary 
organisations. The interviews were conducted in geographic sites that were purposively selected 
based on the objectives of the study and the imperative to cover the widest range of contexts in 
which local government administration is undertaken in Malawi. Informed by these 
considerations, the sample of study sites included rural, urban and peri-urban centres. For the 
urban component, the study sampled Blantyre and Lilongwe cities, while for the peri-urban, the 
research selected Luchenza, Dedza and Karonga, and for the rural, sampled Mwanza.  
exemplified by Mwanza District, Blantyre City and Municipality of Luchenza. The sample was 
also designed to purposively cover all the country’s three regions- Northern , Southern and 
Central. Although in all the study sites,  interviews with key informants was considered adequate 
for establishing administrative practices by the various local government actors, the study also 
used observation and focus group discussions as means to gather data which was used to confirm 
the findings yielded by the interviews. 
 
A more detailed description of the methodology as it applied to the whole project is provided 
elsewhere in the main report of the study. 
 
1.4 Order of presentation 
In this introduction, the paper presents the objectives of the study, briefly outlines its theoretical 
basis, and outlines the methodology employed in the research. In the next section, the paper 
describes the background and context of the study and includes, in that description, milestones in 
the historical development  of local government administration in Malawi, the political economic 
context in which local government administration has evolved and is currently operationalized 
and the constitutional and other legal provisions which establish the normative framework within 
which administrative law and democratic governance interact. The rest of the paper presents and 
discusses the findings of the study. The final section of the paper states the conclusions from the 
findings and makes recommendations. 
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In its analysis and discussion  of the findings of the study, the paper firstly focuses on   rule-
making, then rule-application and, finally, adjudication. In the discussion of   study findings   
each of the three functions, the chapter presents the findings and their analysis and discussion 
under heads that correspond to  the following key  variables identified by the study:  actors, their 
roles and operational processes and mechanisms.  The analysis and discussion of the findings is 
guided by the overarching question of the research project, namely, whether, and to what extent, 
which administrative law and practice in the context of local government in Malawi promotes or  
undermines the principles of participation, the rule of law, accountability and transparency 
through the enforcement of   norms of legality, reasonableness and fairness in everyday 
governance. 
2. BACKGROUND AND COUNTRY CONTEXT 
2.1  A brief history of local government administration in Malawi 
The genesis of formal local government administration in Malawi is traceable to the end of the 
19th Century, when the British Government declared the territory that is now Malawi to be the 
British Central Africa (later Nyasaland) Protectorate. The declaration was formalised by the 
British Central Africa Order-in-Council (1902), the Nyasaland Order-in-Council (1907) and 
various subsequent statutory instruments. In the implementation of its imperial objectives, the 
colonial administration initially established various bureaucratic forms at central government 
level whose operations were, however, hampered by the fact that there were too few  officials  to 
administer the whole territory.  
 
The experiences of the first thirty years of the colonial administration had underscored this 
reality. During this period, which lasted from 1891 to 1912, the colonial administration 
appointed “District Residents” who were, in essence, agents of the central government. The   
mandate of Residents was wide-ranging and unconstrained by any notions of democratic local 
governance such as legality, reasonableness or procedural fairness. On the contrary, Residents 
exercised executive, legislative and judicial functions in processes and mechanisms that did not 
allow for citizen participation or accountability. From 1912 to 1933, the administration 
incorporated chiefs into district administration by empowering them to perform various 
functions, including the maintenance of law and order, encouragement of the payment of taxes, 
and providing sanitation. Despite this arrangement, by 1933, it had become obvious to the 
colonial administration that the use of Residents and chiefs to implement local administration 
faced many challenges, including the lack of enough Residents to effectively administer the 
territory and the Residents’ lack of legitimacy among the “natives.” In response, the colonial 
administration enacted the Native Administration and Native Courts Ordinances which, among 
other things, authorised traditional authorities to make and enforce a wide range of rules in their 
localities. The process and mechanisms for making and applying the rules were evidently 
undemocratic, with the traditional authorities were appointed by the colonial Governor, who also 
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had power to veto their decisions. The rules could also be replaced by those imposed by the 
colonial administration. 
 
The next phase in the development of local government was in the period between 1953 and 
1961 when, for the first time, local government was entrusted to “District Councils” which were  
established under the 1953 Local Government (District Councils) Ordinance. Members of the 
councils were   appointed by the colonial administration. Most powers that had hitherto been 
exercised by traditional authorities were transferred to the Councils. In 1954, the Local 
Government Ordinance stripped Councils of legislative powers and empowered the Minister to 
abolish them. It was only in 1961, that the country had its first experience of elected local 
government councils. An amendment to the Local Government Ordinance provided that district 
councils would consist of elected members, District Commissioners would have only an advisory 
role and chiefs would only be ex officio members.  This arrangement remained in place until 
1994 when the Constitution of the Republic set up local government authorities consisting of 
elected councillors as full members, with chiefs and Members of Parliament as ex officio 
members. Underpinned by the Local Government Act (1998) and the Local Government 
Elections Act (1998), this is the structure of local government that remains in place to date.  
2.2 The legal and institutional framework of local government 
Malawi’s transition from authoritarian one-party rule to a constitutional democracy in 1994 was 
characterised by not only the adoption of a new constitution predicated on the principles of 
democratic governance. It was also followed by the establishment of a legal normative 
framework for the democratic decentralization of state power. The cornerstones of this 
framework were the National Decentralisation Policy (NDP) and the Local Government Act, 
both of which became operational in 1998. Aimed at operationalising democratic 
decentralization, the policy and the Act set up an institutional structure to facilitate governance 
and development at the local level; to make public service more efficient, more economical and 
cost effective; to promote accountability and good governance at the local level; and to mobilize 
citizens for socio–economic development at the local level.  
 
The legal framework for administrative law in Malawi consists of  “underlying principles” and 
“principles of national policy” prescribed by the Constitution;  constitutional provisions that 
guarantee human rights, including the right to administrative justice;  and constitutional and 
statutory norms that establish administrative agencies, define the scope of their power and 
regulate its exercise. While some of the legal norms and rules apply to the government and its 
organs, in general, others apply specifically to particular governmental functions such as 
environmental management, revenue collection and decentralisation.  Cumulatively, the different 
elements of the legal framework set down the institutional mechanism for administrative 




The relevant constitutional “underlying principles” of general application provide that all holders 
of legal and political power are bound to uphold the principles of accountability, transparency, 
the rule of law and human rights.   These principles are equally binding on all agencies 
responsible for public administration.  The Constitution also stipulates principles of national 
policy, which consist of specific goals which the State must pursue by progressively adopting 
and implementing relevant policies and legislation. Among the principles of national policy that 
affect administrative law in general are those which set as national goals: humane application 
and enforcement of laws   and the adoption of “measures which will guarantee accountability, 
transparency, personal integrity and financial probity and which by virtue of their effectiveness 
and visibility will strengthen confidence in public institutions.”   
 
The Constitution expressly permits courts to take account of principles of national policy in 
interpreting and applying the law.  Although courts are not bound to take into account the 
principles of national policy, such an obligation is found in other provisions  of the Constitution, 
including those which guarantee human rights and establish specific administrative institutions 
and impose on them specific their legal obligations. Examples of relevant constitutional 
provisions include section 43 which guarantees every person the right to lawful and procedurally 
“fair administrative action, which is justifiable in relation to reasons given where his or her 
rights, freedoms, legitimate expectations or interests are affected or threatened” and  to be 
“furnished with reasons, in writing, for administrative action where his or her rights, freedoms, 
legitimate expectations or interests are affected.” The Constitution also includes provisions 
which establish and define rulemaking and adjudicatory powers of various administrative bodies 
such as the office of the Ombudsman   and local government councils .   
Of particular interest to this study are provisions of the Constitution which establish local 
government in the following terms: “There shall be local government authorities which shall 
have such powers as are vested in them by this Constitution and an Act of Parliament.”14  The 
Constitution vests  in local authorities the mandate to represent  the people over whom they have 
jurisdiction, for their welfare and  the  responsibility for the promotion of infrastructural and 
economic development, through the formulation and execution of local development plans and 
the encouragement of business enterprise; the presentation to central government authorities of 
local development plans and the promotion of the awareness of local issues to national 
government;  the consolidation and promotion of local democratic institutions and democratic 
participation; and such other functions, including the registration of births and deaths and 
participation in the delivery of essential and local services, as may be prescribed by any Act of 
Parliament.15 
The constitutional provisions are complemented by a range of statutes which establish structures 
of local government, grants them legal powers and provide for the mechanisms and processes 
                                                          
14 Section 146(1). 
15 Section 146(2). 
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through which such powers may be exercised. The most far-reaching of the statutes is the Local 
Government Act which stipulates the objectives of local government to be “to further the 
constitutional order based on democratic principles, accountability, transparency and 
participation of the people in decision-making and development processes.”16 The Act classifies 
local government authorities into District, Municipal and City Councils17 and vests them with a 
wide range of rule-making, rule-application and adjudication powers. Among other things, the 
Act mandates Councils  to make by-laws“ for the good governance” of the areas of their 
jurisdiction,18 and regulate and control environmental management in their areas and implement 
measures to enforce local rates and taxes.19 Rule-making, rule-application and adjudication 
powers are also derived from other statutes, including the Town and Country Planning Act which 
designates District, Municipal and City  Councils as Planning Committees with power to approve 
development plans for their respective  areas of its jurisdiction,20 the Public Health Act which 
requires Councils to take measures to safeguard and promote public health in the areas of their 
jurisdiction,21 the Business Licensing Act which mandates Councils to issue business licences in 
the areas of their jurisdictions on behalf of the Minister of Trade,22 the Chiefs Act which 
empowers traditional authorities  “to  assist  in  the  general  administration  of  the  District  in  
which  his  area  of jurisdiction  is  situate”;23 the Parliamentary and Presidential Elections Act  
which empowers District Commissioners to act as election returning officers for all the 
constituencies in their respective districts, and for such purpose to carry out such functions as the 
District Commissioner may require.24    
The statutory framework that governs administrative agencies also imposes various obligations 
on the agencies requiring them to observe procedural fairness in the exercise of their rulemaking 
and adjudicatory functions and powers. Examples of this  include provisions that seek to prevent 
bias or its appearance such as  those which require disclosure of interests by participants at 
meetings local government Councils  and their  committees, and disqualify any member of a 
Council who has a pecuniary interest in a matter under consideration at any meeting is 
disqualified from voting on the matter.  
2.3 Organisational structure  
The   principal administrative bodies vested with rulemaking and adjudication powers at local 
government level in Malawi are District, Municipal and City Councils. For purposes of local 
government administration, Malawi is demarcated into 28 Districts (see Annex 2). In four of   the 
districts, a geographic area is constituted into an autonomous local government authority which 
                                                          
16 Section 3. 
17 Section 4(2) and (3). 
18 Section 6(f). 
19 Section 78. 
20 Section 61, Town and Country Planning Act. 
21 Section 7, Public Health Act. 
22 G.N. 77/1970 issued under section 7 Businesses Licensing Act. 
23 Section 7(e). 
24 Section 34(2). 
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is vested with a separate legal existence and  designated to be a city or municipality.  The power 
to declare an area to be a municipality is vested in the Minister,25 while that to declare a city is 
vested in the President.26  
 
Established by the Constitution (1994) and the Local Government Act (1998), membership of a 
council consists of local councillors elected by registered voters in the area of its jurisdiction. 
Members of Parliament and Chiefs whose constituencies and areas of jurisdiction fall within the 
boundaries of the district, municipality or city; and administrative personnel “subordinate to 
local councillors” as shall be required to execute and administer the lawful resolutions and 
policies of those councillors. 
 
The functions of councils are defined by the Local Government Act (1998), and include  making  
policy and decisions on local governance and development for the local government area; 
consolidating and promoting local democratic institutions and democratic participation; 
promoting infrastructural and economic development through the formulation, approval and 
execution of district development plans; mobilizing resources within the local government area 
for governance and development; maintaining peace and security in the local government area in 
conjunction with the Malawi Police Service; making by-laws for the good governance of the 
local government area; registering births and deaths; and participating in the delivery of essential 
local services. Each council has a “secretariat” which is responsible for providing administrative 
and management support to council and leading in implementing decisions of the council. In city 
and municipal councils, the secretariats are headed by Chief Executive Officers, while in district 
councils, the heads are designated District Commissioners. 
 
Although not provided for under any law, a structure of committees operates as a mechanism 
through which communities participate in development planning and decision-making. The 
committees are organized hierarchically, with the  Area Development Committees (ADCs) at the 
apex of the order. The geographic scope of the jurisdiction of each ADC coincides with that of a 
Traditional Authority. Below ADCs are Area Executive Committees (AECs) which 
communicate to ADCs needs assessments, project identifications and project proposals 
originating from   Village Development Committees (VDCs) which serve as representative 
bodies at the level of the village, and are charged with the responsibility of facilitating, planning 
and development at the grassroots level.   
 
The administrative functions and powers of District, Municipal and City Councils overlap with 
those of locally-based administrative units of the central government and traditional authorities. 
Virtually all central government Ministries have offices and officials at district level as part of 
the de-concentration of central government’s   institutional structure and organisation. Thus, for 
                                                          
25 Local Government Act, section 4(2). 
26 Ibid., section 4(3). 
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example, the Ministry of Health has a District Health Officer (DHO), the Ministry of Education 
has a District Education Manager (DEM), the Ministry of Water has a District Water 
Development Officer (DWDO), the Ministry of Forestry has the District Forestry Officer (DFO) 
and the Ministry of Agriculture has a District Agricultural Development Officer (DADO). The 
district offices of central government ministries, departments and agencies embody the overlap  
between central and local government because, in addition to performing central government 
functions, the offices and their officers are also an integral part of some Council structures such 
as the District Executive Committee (DEC) and the District Coordinating Team (DCT)  which 
serve essentially as sub-committees of the councils. 
 
On its part, the overlap of powers and functions of councils arises because statutory and 
customary laws empower traditional authorities to exercise authority over matters and  
geographic areas that are also vested in councils by the Chiefs Act which establishes a hierarchy 
of traditional authorities consisting of, in descending order:  Paramount Chiefs, Senior Chiefs, 
Traditional Authorities, Group Village Heads and Village Heads.  Paramount Chiefs, Senior 
Chiefs and Traditional Authorities are appointed by the President provided, among other things, 
that the prospective appointee  has the support of the majority of the people in the area of 
jurisdiction of the office in  question; and, in the case of the office of Senior Chief, is a chief and 
is recognized by all chiefs in his district as being entitled under customary law.27 On their part, 
Group Village Heads and Village Heads are appointed by Traditional Authorities although, as 
noted in the case of Robeni v Senior Chief Makanjira,28the Act curiously  does not require that 
the appointee be entitled according to customary law. Traditional authorities are an integral part 
of local government administration.  By virtue of the Local Government Act, Paramount Chiefs, 
Senior Chiefs and Traditional Authorities are ex officio members of District and Municipal 
Councils. 
 
3. RULE-MAKING  
Rule-making by administrative agencies occupies the space between framework legislation and 
ground-level decision-making (Thomas, 2013: 135). In practical terms, this places on 
administrative decision-makers the responsibility of translating broad legislative intent into 
specific decisions in particular cases, whose facts, in some cases, could not have been foreseen 
by the legislature when it enacted the framework legislation. This is the case with respect to 
specific rules that administrative agencies are mandated to make in different circumstances. The 
potential of those rules to work for the public benefit depends significantly on the type of rules 
that administrators choose to formulate and apply (ibid.). The key factors that are likely to 
influence that choice towards rules that promote administrative justice are whether the actors 
                                                          
27 Chiefs Act,  Section 4(b),  
28 Civil Cause No.476 of 2012. 
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involved in making the rules, the norms that the actors adopt and the procedures and mechanisms 
that they use in making the rules adhere to principles of administrative law.  
  
Assessment of whether, and to what extent, administrative rule-making by local government 
comply with principles of administrative justice, therefore, requires an investigation of the 
actors, norms and procedures and mechanisms. This study undertook that investigation and its  
findings are reported and discussed below. 
3.1 Actors  
Informed by the literature on the importance of actors in influencing the quality of rulemaking, 
the study identified a number of factors that influence the decisional choices made by actors  
who have the mandate to make rules at local government level in Malawi. The study grouped  
the factors into those that relate to actors with respect to legality, procedural fairness and 
rationality and respectively. Data were collected on the role of administrative agencies in rule-
making and adjudication in order to establish   the legal basis of the power and authority that 
they exercise as well as  the rationality and procedural fairness of their decisions and actions 
within the processes.     
 
The first main finding was that rule-making at local government level is undertaken by a 
proliferation of administrative agencies and other actors which    may be classified into three 
broad categories. The first consists of actors who are   part of the formal structure of local 
government, the second  comprises actors who are formally part of both local government and 
central government; and  the third  consists of actors who are part of neither local nor central 
government. The multiplicity of   actors and the variations in their institutional character   affect  
the potential  of administrative rulemaking to contribute to governance. This is discussed in 




The second main finding regarding actors who make rules at 
local government level is that  a significant number of them 
lack the necessary legal mandate. The study found the most 
far-reaching instance of rulemaking by actors  who had no 
legal mandate occurred in the period between 2005 and 2014.  
Although  the Constitution required local government 
elections to be  held one year after presidential and 
parliamentary elections, the executive, whose responsibility it 
was to facilitate them, chose not to do so in 1995, 2005 and 
2010 although the presidential and parliamentary elections 
had  taken place in 1994, 2004 and 2009. Consequently, from 
2005 to 2014, local government structures did not include 
elected councillors who are the only actors in whom the law 
vests rule-making powers. In practice, the gap was filled by 
administrative structures which purported to exercise   the 
rulemaking powers that the law vests exclusively in elected 
councillors.   The most notable of the structures that were 
established in every district, municipality and city formation 
were Consultative Forums and Executive Committees which, 
among other things, made various rules, including some 
which purported to regulate revenue collection by the 
councils. Although in one case, the High Court declared such 
exercise of power to be ultra vires,   in another, the same 
court, albeit with a different judge presiding, held that the 
necessity of having a functioning local government 
administration outweighed the lack of a legal mandate by 
administrative structures which exercised powers that legally 
could only be exercised by elected councils.  The two cases 
are described in more detail in Box 1.29 Of particular 
relevance for this study is the fact that the case that 
subordinated  legality to pragmatic necessity in effect 
undermined the potential of administrative law to contribute 
to democratic governance. Since that decision was made, 
however, the High Court has delivered another judgment in 
which it stated that legality should never be sacrificed for 
necessity.30  
                                                          
29 In a case based on a similar issues, the High Court held that in the period when there were no elected councilors, 
officials could legally enforce resolutions that had been made in the past by duly-constituted councils: see Blantyre 
City Assembly v Kammwamba 2008 MLR 21.   





Malawi did not hold local government elections in 
1995, 2004 and 2009. There were therefore no 
elected local authorities between 1995 and 2014 
when the elections were held. Under the Local 
Government Act (1998), only elected councils 
have the power to regulate, collect and vary local 
government fees and other payments of revenue, 
including rates. In the absence of elected local 
authorities, decisions and actions, including the 
raising of rates and collection of fees, were taken 
by technocrats, employed to serve councils, and 
make-shift “District/Urban Consultative Forums” 
(DCF)  comprising traditional chiefs, MPs and  
representatives of interest groups.  
 
In 2005, the Chief Executive Officer of the city of 
Mzuzu  informed some rate-payers in the city that 
their properties would be sold by the council  as 
they had failed to  pay city rates due. One of the 
affected ratepayers commenced a legal challenge 
against this decision on the basis that the DCF 
had no legal mandate to regulate or administer 
revenue-collection as this was the exclusive 
mandate of elected councillors [Bandawe v 
Mzuzu City Assembly et. al. Civil Cause No. 63 of 
2006]. The High Court agreed with the ratepayers 
and held that the  DCF had acted ultra vires. 
However, in a case with similar facts, the High 
Court held that although the DCF had no legal 
mandate, its actions were justified by the fact that 
revenue collection was necessary in order to 
sustain the delivery of public services 






Rulemaking by actors who lack the requisite legal mandate is not confined to the historical 
experience  of consultative fora and executive committees established in local councils. The 
study found this to be currently the case also with VDCs , ADCs and EDCs which, despite not 
being established  or granted rulemaking power by  any law ,  are involved in the rule-making 
process   by  councils.  The study found that the nature and extent of the involvement  of the 
committees varied from place to place. Thus, for example, in Mwanza District, the Council’s 
Director of Finance indicated that in the making of finance-related rules by the Council, ADCs 
and VDCs are “normally consulted.” This was corroborated by the District Commissioner who 
indicated that VDCs and ADC’s were part of “consultative forums” that the Council arranges.  
 
Another example of an institution that plays a significant role in rule-making  despite having no 
legal mandate is the “town chief.” Chosen by residents of particular residential areas or having 
been hereditary traditional chiefs before their areas were incorporated into cities, municipalities 
or district centres, “town chiefs” lead in the making and enforcement  of rules for communities in 
urban and peri-urban residential areas. “Town chiefs” make rules applicable in their assumed 
areas of jurisdiction mainly with respect to collective social activities such as funerals,  and serve 
as the foremost primary justice forum for the adjudication of disputes among community 
members.    Previous studies have established that many communities accept the legitimacy of 
“town chiefs” and submit to their authority.  The central government has, on a number of 
occasions, declared that “town chiefs” have no legal mandate to exercise any power and directed 
them to cease to operate.  The government’s declaration was based on section 3(5) of the Chiefs 
Act which effectively prohibits chiefs from exercising jurisdiction within cities, municipalities or 
towns.  
 
The present study found that, despite that prohibition, the government’s directive has been 
resisted by a significant number of “chiefs”, using a number of actions including an 
unprecedented march in the country’s commercial city It is telling that, in the wake of that 
resistance, the central government has taken no further action to enforce the abolition of the 
institution and continues to pay some urban chiefs the same honoraria as is paid to chiefs whose 
legal mandate is uncontested because they exercise jurisdiction in areas outside cities, 
municipalities and towns. Further,  city and municipal authorities continue to recognise the de 
facto authority of town chiefs and permit them to make rules that apply in their areas with the 
support of the councils. It is arguable that this is another example of the subordination of legality 
to legitimacy in that the central and local government authorities recognise the political risks of 
enforcing the law against an institution that is regarded as an essential part of Malawian 
community life.  
 
Another group of actors who play a significant role in rule-making despite having no specific 
legal  mandate are voluntary citizens’  associations. The decisions and actions of many of such 
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associations are accepted as legitimate by both the people affected by them as well as the formal 
structures of local government. The groups were essentially special interest lobby groups 
established  to promote and protect their members’ sectoral interests. Associations in this 
category that the study identified included “market committees,” which were found to operate  in 
all markets managed by  city, municipal and district councils; associations of   providers of 
services or goods, for example the  Bicycle Taxi Operators Association in Luchenza 
Municipality, Mzuzu Street Vendors Association and Mzuzu Kabaza Operators in Mzuzu City, 
Balaka Taxi Operators in Machinga District, Blantyre Street Vendors Association and Blantyre 
City Garden Owners Association in Blantyre City  and Lilongwe Street Vendors Association in 
Lilongwe City.    
The study found that, despite having no legal basis  for their purported power to make rules, 
VDCs, ADCs, EDCs “town chiefs” and citizens’ voluntary groups  are  involved in rulemaking 
on the initiative of local councils    in at least two respects. First, they are consulted by  councils 
in the course of exercising their formal 
rulemaking power, as was found in 
Mwanza District Council, where its 
Director of Finance stated that the 
council consults market committees as 
part of its process of making finance-
related by-laws. Second, they  make 
various rules  that apply to not only 
their members but also members of the 
public.  In the making of the rules, the 
committees receive   active support 
from the formal local government 
authorities. 
 
Although most of the voluntary 
associations sampled in this study were 
found to be  self-regulating, market 
committees appeared to attract external 
interference in their rulemaking in the 
form of direct interventions by council 
officials in key governance processes of 
the committees such as the conduct of elections of their leaders.  Although some council staff 
interviewed in the study claimed that market committees were permitted to operate 
independently, with the council playing only a facilitative role, evidence suggests that councils 
play a more interventionist role. In 2015, for example, the Chief Executive Officer of Zomba 
City Council “nullified” election of  a market committee for Zomba City’s Central Market (See 
Box 2). 
BOX 2 
Notice of The Central Market Election Re-Run. 
Following the information that Council has gathered 
from both sides on how the process of electing the 
central market committee went, it has been 
observed that there were some problems that 
affected the election process.  The problems include 
the failure to count the votes and the faulty 
procedures used in the election process. Hence the 
first election has been nullified and the market 
neither has a committee or a chairman.  
 
Due to the problems stated above, council has 
decided to have an election   re-run of the central 
market committee on 21st May 2015. All those who 
took part in the election are being invited. The 
procedure of the election will be communicated 





Significantly, the notice did not provide sufficient details of the reasons why the election was 
nullified, and merely alleged that there had been “some problems’ including the failure to count 
votes and “faulty procedures.”  In the same notice the Chief Executive Officer indicated that 
procedures for the re-run of the elections would be communicated to all participants by the 
Council at an unspecified day before the election. 
In  a significant number of instances, the legality of the power and authority of rulemaking 
administrative agencies is not absent- as is the case with the development committees, town 
chiefs and citizens’ associations described above- but contested. Two forms of contestation were 
identified by the study. The first is where it was the legal basis authority of particular office-
holders that was challenged on the basis that they were not entitled to hold their rule-making 
offices. This type of challenge does not question the legal basis of the office itself, but that of the 
authority of particular incumbents. The study established that this is most prevalent with respect 
to chiefs who, as was noted earlier, play an important role in rule-making both as ex officio 
members of councils as well as in their own right as promulgators and arbiters of rules of 
customary law. Increasingly, chiefs have also made rules aimed at addressing various social 
challenges confronting their communities. In this regard, some chiefs have unilaterally 
proclaimed rules, which some members of the public and the media refer to as “by-laws” 
although under the law, by-laws can   be made at the local government level by councils.  
Although the legality of such rule-making by chiefs is debatable, the making of such rules has 
received widespread public support mainly because most of the rules are aimed at addressing 
negative social practices such as truancy, early marriages and other “harmful” cultural practices.  
 
However, the legal mandate of some of those traditional authorities has been contested. In almost 
all instances of such challenges, the contestation has related to competing interpretations of 
customary law on which the traditional authorities base their claims to office. In some cases, 
competing claims have resulted in vacancies in chieftaincies pending the resolution of   disputes, 
thereby, creating gaps in institutional framework involved in rule-making, such as councils, 
VDCs, ADCs and EDCs. A striking example of such competing claims which the study 
discovered was that involving  the position of   Senior Chief Kabunduli in Nkhata-Bay District in 
which a vacancy existed in the office for eight years as various attempts were made to resolve 
the contestation over the office. 
 
The other type of contestation over the legality of rule-making power identified by the study was 
that in which two or more actors claim rule-making powers over the same subject-matter or 
geographical area.  The study found the most significant of such jurisdictional overlaps to exist 
between local government councils and central government Ministries, Councillors and 
Members of Parliament, councillors and chiefs. The finding is best exemplified by comparing the 
power of local government councils  and chiefs.  The Local Government Act empowers councils 
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to make by-laws “for the good rule and government of the whole or any part of the local 
government area or, as the case may be for the prevention and suppression of nuisances therein 
and for any other purpose.”  On its part, the Chiefs Act empowers chiefs to preserve the public 
peace and to carry out the traditional functions of their office under customary law. The  
geographic scope of the respective  jurisdictions of councils and chiefs overlap, thereby raising 
the  likelihood of conflicts between the two over the power to make rules in particular cases. The 
study found evidence of such overlaps and conflicts. For example, while councils are obliged to 
prohibit the disposal of human bodies otherwise than by interment in any cemetery or cremation 
at any crematorium established or permitted under the Public Health Act,31  under customary 
law, it is chiefs who have the power to decide where community burial places should be located. 
Similarly, while councils are empowered to control or prohibit “singing, dancing, … the making 
of any noise whatsoever likely to disturb any person,”32  under customary laws these functions 
fall within the statutory mandate of chiefs to preserve the public peace33 and  to carry out the 
traditional functions of their office under customary law such as the regulation of public 
nuisances. 
To the extent that the legal mandates of actors who make rules at local government lebvel There 
are wide variations in the quality of actors who do not have specific legal mandates   because 
there are no legal prescriptions of their minimum qualifications and experience. It follows from 
this that there are wide variations among the actors with respect to their levels of knowledge of 
administrative law principles and appreciation of the necessity of applying them. 
 
Procedural fairness 
In Malawi, procedural fairness in administrative processes is not only a requirement of the 
common law, but also a human right guaranteed expressly by the Constitution which provides   
that: “Every person shall have the right to-(a)lawful and procedurally fair administrative action, 
which is justifiable in relation to reasons given where his or her rights, freedoms, legitimate 
expectations or interests are affected or threatened; and (b) be furnished with reasons, in writing, 
for administrative action where his or her rights, freedoms, legitimate expectations or interests 
are affected.”   
The right to administrative justice as guaranteed by the Constitution and the common law is 
reinforced by various statutes which provide for the right to be heard and the rule against bias in 
local government rulemaking. An example of such a provision identified by the study is section 
103 of the Local Government Act which entitle any person wishing to make any observation 
upon or an objection to any proposed by-law to present such observation or objection to the 
council before it submits the bye-law for approval. Another example is section 12 of the same 
Act which promotes procedural fairness by obliging any member present at a meeting of the 
                                                          
31 Local Government Act, Second Schedule, Part 3(b). 
32 Local Government Act, Second Schedule, Part 4(c). 
33 Chiefs Act, section 21. 
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Council or of any committee of the Council  who has an interest in  a matter under discussion by 
the meeting to disclose such interest and, unless the Council or committee otherwise directs,  to 
recuse himself or herself.  
 
The study found very few instances in which citizens had presented observations or objections to 
proposed by-laws. One of the few exceptional instances was found in Luchenza where the 
Bicycle Taxi Owners Association raised objections relating to a proposal by the municipal 
council to relocate their designated place of business. In another instance, the Minibus Owners 
Association of Malawi objected to a by-law proposed by Blantyre City Council aimed at 
relocating a bus terminus. Except for the few instances in which interest groups objected to by-
laws, there was no evidence indicating a widespread exercise of the right to object by individual 
citizens. It is also important to note that  the study found documented cases of objection to by-
laws only in the cities and peri-urban centres and noted that in almost all cases of objection, the 
objectors consisted of relatively powerful interest groups.   
 
The   declaration of principles of procedural fairness in the law can contribute to governance 
only if it is followed  by the willingness and ability of decision-makers to apply the relevant rules 
in practice. Gauging such ability and willingness requires an investigation of the competence of 
the decision-makers and the totality of incentives which motivate their decisional choices. The 
study made four main findings with respect to the specific internal and external factors that drive 
local government actors in Malawi to apply legal principles and rules of procedural fairness in 
rulemaking. 
 
The first finding was that the vast majority of administrative decision-makers at local 
government level have either very limited or no knowledge of the scope and limits of  the roles 
of various actors who are involved in rulemaking at local government level. The practical 
consequence of such limited knowledge is uncertainty regarding whom to hold accountable and 
how; undue jurisdictional conflict among actors which militates against the development of 
common administrative standards. Literature reviewed for the study, indicated that the most 
pronounced of such conflicts is that between councilors and Members of Parliament. In addition 
to counterproductive jurisdictional conflicts, low levels of awareness and knowledge of the roles 
of local government actors has more profound consequences for administrative law and 
democratic governance. Among the citizenry, low levels of awareness and knowledge contribute 
to low citizens’ demand that administrators comply  with the principles legality, rationality or 
procedural fairness by administrators. The study found very low levels of awareness of the actors 
who make rules. This finding resonates with the observation by an earlier study which found that  
among “ few ordinary citizens understand the process of democratic decentralisation.....A few 
local elite are aware that the councillors will have an accountability function vis-à-vis sector staff 
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and the DC. But beyond that, there is little knowledge of the structure of council and committees 
or their detailed work.”34  
 
The second finding was that the vast majority of administrative decision-makers at local 
government level have either very limited or no knowledge of the formal principles of procedural 
fairness that the Constitution obliges them to apply in rulemaking. The exception is District 
Commissioners(DCs) , Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of cities and municipalities, almost all 
of whom are graduates of the University of Malawi where they studied administrative law as part 
of their public administration studies.   In contrast, levels of knowledge of formal administrative 
law principles of procedural fairness were generally lower, or non-existent, among    councillors,   
mid- and lower-level local government officers, chiefs and leaders of citizens’ voluntary 
associations. Without such knowledge, rule-makers cannot be expected to apply principles and 
rules of procedural fairness consistently or at all.  Although it is possible to gain knowledge of 
principles of procedural fairness through experiential learning, the study found that this is 
impeded in practice by a number of factors, the most significant of which appeared to be limited 
information-sharing and lesson-learning within and across local government administrative units. 
The study found no systematic institutional forums or processes through which  knowledge of 
principles of procedural fairness in rulemaking could be transferred from DCs, CEOs and 
Directors to those who have a deficit of such knowledge. The situation is compounded by poor 
record-keeping and documentation of rule-making processes and outcomes by most actors 
involved in rulemaking. In most offices where records of proceedings were kept, the filing was 
done manually, hundreds- if not thousands- of records were stored in limited physical space and 
were hardly accessible to officials, let alone members of the general public.Comprehensive and 
systematic records of rulemaking processes would provide a resource that would facilitate self-
learning on the part of decision-makers who might not have been formally trained in 
administrative law. 
Key Informants also reported that there is   no systematic method by which court judgments are 
distributed to local government administrators to enable them to become familiar with judicial 
interpretations of the principle of procedural fairness. These include, lower level officials, 
Councilors, Members of Parliament, chiefs and members of informal institution. On the demand 
side, levels of knowledge are equally low.  
 
Overall, the data suggest that compliance with the requirements of procedural fairness in rule-
making at local government level in Malawi   is very limited, especially in relation to decisions 
and actions of lower-level officials in administrative agencies who have limited or no formal 
knowledge of principles of procedural fairness laid down by the Constitution, statutes and the 
common law.   





The principle of rationality requires that decisions and actions be rational in the sense that they 
must be based on relevant considerations, aimed at proper purposes, be proportional and not be 
actuated by bad faith. The principle has constitutional authority by virtue of section 43 which 
requires, among other things, that administrative decisions be “justifiable in relation to reasons 
given” and has been endorsed by the courts on numerous occasions. This study sought to 
investigate the application of the principle in rulemaking by local government actors, informed 
by literature which suggests that, in practice, the capacity and willingness of the various actors 
involved in rule-making to make  decisions that comply with the principle of rationality depends 
on the relative weight of the various incentives and disincentives that motivate actors to comply 
or not comply with the law.  
 
The study found that the vast majority of local government actors in rulemaking who were 
interviewed had no knowledge of the legal guarantee of principle of rationality, although many 
appeared to state intuitively that decision-makers must not make absurd decisions. 
Unsurprisingly, actors who had received training in administrative law, such as District 
Commissioners, Municipal and City Executive Officers and some Directors, demonstrated some 
knowledge of the elements of the principle and rules of rationality. However, the study found 
that knowledge of the requirements of the principle of rationality did not necessarily result in 
rational rule-making because the obligation to comply with the principle is occasionally 
outweighed by various disincentives. 
The study found the most influential disincentive to be political pressure that is exerted on   
actors to make decisions regardless of their compliance with the principle of rationality.  
 As indicated in the discussion of legality in rulemaking, the legal framework requires rationality 
in administrative processes.  
For example, the power of the central government to demote or transfer of Chief Executives of 
cities and municipalities and district commissioners to less desirable postings is used to 
encourage them to make decisions favourable to the party in government, regardless of their 
rationality.  The study found one case in which a Chief Executive Officer had been demoted and 
transferred to a smaller district apparently for having decided to permit a leader of an opposition 
party to use premises under the control of the council to conduct an election campaign rally. It 
also found one case in which a Minister effectively threatened a District Commissioner with 
unspecified action for making a decision that did not favour the party in government.  
The complying with the requirements of rationality, therefore, depends on the ability of the 
decision-maker to resist countervailing political pressure. One District Commissioner 
interviewed in the study suggested that decision-makers who have knowledge of the legal limits 
of the power of the central government to abuse ministerial powers are better able to resist 
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political pressure than those who are not. Although the study did not investigate the involvement 
of political pressure in the circumstances, there have been a number of cases in which District 
Commissioners have obtained High Court injunctions against ministerial directives to demote or 
transfer them.   
The study identified two contextual issues that have a significant impact on actors with respect to 
their ability and willingness to apply principles of   rationality  in rule-making. The two issues 
are the dominance of a neo-patrimonial political culture and judicial independence. The former is 
manifested in the tendency of the dominant political regime to capture public administration for 
its own political ends. The incidence of this tendency in relation to local government and its 
effects in Malawi are well documented, including in a study of  Malawi and Uganda conducted 
in 2007.35 Essentially, in the context of a political culture which is characterized by the 
dominance of neo-patrimonialism decision-makers are vulnerable to negative incentives that 
militate against rational rule-making and adjudication. 
Judicial independence acts as a countervailing factor that provides an incentive to administrators 
to resist political pressure to make irrational decisions. The judiciary in Malawi is generally 
perceived to be independent. As such, administrators who are pressured into making irrational 
decisions can rely on the judiciary to come to their protection by exercising its power of judicial 
review independently. The potential of the judiciary to contribute to the upholding of principles 
of administrative law is, however, limited because very few of the numerous actors involved in 
rule-making and adjudication at the local government level in Malawi have the knowledge and 
means to access the High Court and apply for judicial review. This   reflects the general 
limitations of access to justice in Malawi that have been documented in available literature and is 
discussed in more detail in the section that analyses the study’s findings on adjudication.  
3.2 Processes and mechanisms 
Rule-making at local government level is undertaken through a complex set of formal and 
informal processes and mechanisms which are driven by either central or local government 
agencies. Rules made the central government mainly take the form of legislation passed by 
Parliament using standard parliamentary procedures stipulated in Parliamentary Standing Orders 
and subsidiary legislation made by Ministers under the authority of specific legislation. 
Examples of primary legislation with local government application include the Town and 
Country Planning Act, which, among other things, vests councils with the power to approve 
development plans for the area of its jurisdiction ; the Police Act, which empowers District 
Commissioners to receive and process notices of public demonstrations and assemblies intended 
to be held in their jurisdiction;   the Public Health Act which among other things imposes on 
local authorities obligations to take measures to safeguard and promote public health in the areas 
of their jurisdiction;   and the Business Licensing Act, under which local Councils are mandated 
to issue business licences in the areas of their jurisdictions, on behalf of the Minister of Trade, 
                                                          
35 Cammack 2007 
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On its part, Parliamentary and Presidential Elections Act  empowers District Commissioners to 
act as Returning Officers for all the constituencies in their respective districts, under the Land 
Act , a chief can authorize the use   and occupation of customary land within his area. 
The central government also contributes to rulemaking at local government level through the 
making of delegated legislation. Such delegation has played a significant role in the regulation of  
a wide variety of social, economic and political issues, including development control, 
environmental management. In respect of development control, for example, the Town and 
Country Planning Act empowers the Minister to make regulations including those that prescribe 
the forms of applications for  grants of development permission and the type of materials to be 
used in the construction of buildings and fences. The exercise of the  power of Ministers to make 
delegated legislation must comply with the principles of legality, rationality and fairness. The 
most significant finding of the study in this regard was that the process of making most delegated 
legislation in Malawi violates the principle of legality. 
The processes and mechanisms for rulemaking by the formal structures of local government are 
regulated by a variety of legal provisions. The primary of these is the Constitution which 
stipulates in section 146 that the structure and general mandate of local councils to include the 
formulation and execution of local development plans and the consolidation and promotion of 
local democratic institutions and democratic participation. More specifically, section 103 of the 
Local Government Act empowers Councils “to make by-laws for the good rule and government 
of the whole or any part of the local government area or, as the case may be for the prevention 
and suppression of nuisances therein and for any other purpose.” The Act further stipulates the 
procedural requirements for the making of by-laws (see Box 1).  
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The bulk of rulemaking at the local government 
level is, however, undertaken by local government 
councils. The process through which such rules are 
made varies with the type of rule in question. 
Ideally, the making of bye-laws starts with 
proposals made by councilors based on 
recommendations from the District, City or 
Municipal Development Committee. The proposals 
are then formulated in appropriate form by 
technocrats at district level who consist of Chief 
Executive Officers or District Commissioners and 
heads of directorates of various sectors, including 
planning and development, finance, health, 
education, agriculture, water and administration. 
The formulated proposals are then tabled before 
the council which deliberates and votes on them. 
The study established that once adopted by the 
council, by-laws are then transmitted to the 
Ministry of Local Government which has the 
responsibility of laying them before Parliament as 
required by the Constitution. 
In theory, the prescribed process for making by-
laws provides for a significant degree of both 
indirect and direct public participation in local 
government processes, including rulemaking. The 
primary form of indirect participation is through 
the agency of elected councilors whose 
responsibility it is to represent their constituents’ 
interests in the deliberation and enactment of by-
laws. In all the study sites, there are also a number 
of administrative structures which are intended to 
provide citizens the opportunity to participate in 
rulemaking through elected representatives. Such 
structures include   Village and Area   Committees 
which, inter alia, make inputs into rulemaking by the council. In addition to the formal 
mechanisms, councils also occasionally set up ad hoc consultative forums at which 
representatives of selected non-governmental organisations participate in  deliberations over 
various matters, including the making of rules. 
Box 1 
Section 103, Local Government Act (1998) 
(1) The by-laws shall be made under the common 
seal of the Council and shall not have effect until 
they are approved by the Minister. 
(2) At least fourteen days before application for 
approval of the by-laws is made, notice of the 
intention to apply for approval shall be published in 
the Gazette and in one or more local newspapers 
circulating in the area to which the by-laws are to 
apply and such notice shall include representations 
in writing from any person wishing to make any 
observation upon or an objection to such proposed 
by-law. A copy of every such representation or 
objection shall be forwarded by the Council to the 
Minister. 
(3) For at least fourteen days before application for 
approval is made, a copy of the by-laws are made, 
and shall be deposited at the offices of the Council 
by whom the by-laws are made, and shall be open 
to public inspection without payment of any fee 
during the Council’s normal hours of business. 
(4) The Council by whom the by-laws are made 
shall, on application, furnish to any person a copy of 
the by-laws, or of any part thereof, on payment of 
such sum as the Council may determine. 
(5) The Minister may approve or refuse to approve 
any by-laws, and may fix the date on which the by-
laws are to come into operation and if no date is 
so fixed the by-law shall come into operation at the 
expiration of fourteen days from the date of its 
approval. 
(6) A copy of the by-laws, when approved, shall be 
published in the Gazette and shall be printed and 
deposited at the offices of the Council by whom the 
by-laws are made, and shall at all reasonable hours 
be open to public inspection without payment, and a 
copy thereof shall, on application, be furnished to 
any person on payment of such sum, for every copy, 
as the Council may determine. 
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Given the formal existence of processes and mechanisms aimed at facilitating public indirect 
participation in the making of rules at local government level, the study investigated the 
incidence of such participation and its transformative or instrumentalist effect. The main finding 
in this regard was that the level of participation in the formal rulemaking processes of councils is 
low both in frequency and effectiveness. Councillors are not accessible enough to provide their 
constituents the opportunity to make inputs into the councilors contribution in the making f by-
laws.  With respect to ad hoc consultative forums at which   participation by selected citizens’ 
groups is invited, respondents who had participated were generally of the view that their 
participation had had little effect on the outcomes of the “consultation.” Representatives of 
vendors attending council meetings who were interviewed during the study, for example, viewed 
their inputs into the making of rules as futile because it appeared to them  that the content of the 
rules had already been decided by the council’s bureaucrats and councillors. Other community 
members generally felt that participating in debates of draft by-laws was pointless as there 
appeared to be no possibility of effectively influencing any changes. The majority of civil society 
and other citizen respondents viewed the processes and mechanisms for public participation to be 
aimed more at legitimizing pre-determined rules than to allow the public to influence their 
content and form. The study further found that almost invariably, it was mostly well-established 
non-governmental organisations which were invited to participate in ad hoc consultative forums. 
From a democratic governance perspective, this militates against equality of participation which 
is a cardinal principle of deliberative democracy.36 It also highlights the pedagogical need to 
factor an understanding of the nature, roles and influence of special interest groups into the 
explanation of administrative participation.37 
The study found a number of legal provisions that provide for direct public participation by the 
public in rulemaking. One of the most significant examples of such provisions is section 103(2) 
of the Local Government Act which provides that: “At least fourteen days before application for 
approval of the by-laws is made, notice of the intention to apply for approval shall be published 
in the Gazette and in one or more local newspapers circulating in the area to which the by-laws 
are to apply and such notice shall include representations in writing from any person wishing to 
make any observation upon or an objection to such proposed by-law.” The study   found   that 
the vast majority of members of the public do not have an adequate opportunity to make inputs 
into by-laws before they are submitted for Ministerial approval because their publication as 
required by section 103(3) is limited to notices pasted on the notice boards of council offices, 
places that are not readily accessible to the majority of citizens, some of whom live as far away 
as 50 kilometers away from their nearest council offices./////////// 38   
With respect to direct participation, the study found that members of citizens’ voluntary groups 
perceived their participation on rulemaking by the organisations to be substantial. The majority 
                                                          
36 Habermas, 1984. 
37 Seifter, Miriam. "Second-Order Participation in Administrative Law." UCLA Law Review, Forthcoming (2015). 
38 Kutengule et. al. 2004: 15. 
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of market traders, for example, considered themselves to be effective in influencing the content 
of rules especially those made by traders in the same section of the market for their own 
regulation.   
A notable feature of the legal provisions that regulate rulemaking through local government 
processes and mechanisms is that it empowers the central government to control them. Examples 
of provisions that enable central government control include the provision that allows which 
empowers the Minister to approve or refuse to approve any by-laws, and to fix the date on which 
the by-laws come into operation; that which empowers Members of Parliament to be voting 
members of local councils; that which vests in the Minister the discretionary power to appoint, 
transfer and discipline city and municipal Chief Executive Officers and District Commissioners. 
The involvement of central government at the local government level, limits the autonomy of 
local government rulemaking processes and mechanisms. It also makes it more difficult for the 
people who will be affected at local government level by central government decisions to 
participate in those decisions. To illustrate this challenge to democratic governance, respondents 
cited the amendments to the Local Government Act which gave more control of local 
government by the central government which were passed by Parliament without any significant 
input by citizens. 
The general stipulations of the Constitution and the Local Government Act are complemented by   
guidelines that seek to regulate rulemaking in particular cases, including the Malawi Public 
Service Regulations (MPSR) and the Local Government Authorities Service Staff issued by the 
central government and the Ministry of Local Government respectively. The study established 
that accessibility of these guidelines to actors involved in rulemaking processes and mechanisms 
is extremely limited, even among those with the most influence within those processes and 
mechanisms, such as heads of directorates of local councils and members of local councils. The 
study further found that the incorporation of administrative law principles  in the guidelines is 
neither systematic nor comprehensive. By default, rule making processes and mechanisms 
mainly rely on the discretionary judgment of decision-makers to ensure that rulemaking 
processes and mechanisms are lawful, rational and procedurally fair.   The situation is 
compounded by the lack of clear procedural rules in some instances. As observed in an earlier 
study, glaring omissions are evident  in relation  to procedures governing local authorities’ 
meetings, revenue collection and discipline.39 
Other rule-making processes and mechanisms are less rigidly regulated than those directly 
controlled by formal local government structures. This is the case mainly with rules made by 
informal actors, such as the various formations of stakeholders, such as the committees and 
associations of businesspersons and other providers of goods and services. As indicated earlier, 
                                                          
39 Hussein, M. 2005: “Good governance and the new local government system in Malawi: challenges and 
prospects.” D.Phil Thesis, University of Johannesburg, available at https://ujdigispace.uj.ac.za/handle/10210/1373, 




the such committees and associations are not established by law. The study also established that 
the vast majority of such groupings do not have written constitutions or codes to regulate their 
processes and mechanisms. It is therefore not surprising that their rule-making processes and 
mechanisms are largely informal and that the study was not able to establish common rules that 
govern those processes and mechanisms. In general, though, there appeared to be an expectation 
on the part of stakeholders that the regulation of rulemaking processes would be consultative and 
include inputs from those affected by the rules. The study found this to be the expectation of 
members of market committees in all the districts sampled. Committees in all the markets 
studied were expected by stakeholders to make rules based on inputs from the heads of the 
different sections in respective markets. 
The study investigated the incidence and quality of public participation in the processes of 
rulemaking and made a number of findings. The  first is that the law makes some provision for 
public participation in the making of by-laws by local government councils, 
Three main findings emerged from the data collected on the legality of the processes and 
mechanisms of local government rulemaking. The first was that there is a clear legal framework 
that underpins rulemaking by local councils, while the legality of rulemaking processes and 
mechanisms is unclear and debatable. The second is that the central government plays a direct 
role in rulemaking at local government level, thereby limiting the autonomy of local government 
process and mechanisms, contrary to the letter and spirit of decentralized democratic governance. 
The third is that there is no systematic or comprehensive incorporation of administrative law 
principles in the subsidiary legislation and other guidelines that regulate rulemaking processes 
and mechanisms at the local government level. 
 
Data collected in this study indicates that the other factor that impedes the application of 
administrative law principles in rulemaking processes is the limited accessibility of relevant rules 
and guidelines to decision-makers. Most administrative decision-makers at the local level have 
no access to up-to-date texts of the Constitution, the Local Government Act or judgments of the 
High Court which stipulate the elements of procedural fairness. Consequently, many 
administrators exercise rulemaking and adjudicatory powers oblivious of current constitutional, 
statutory and common law norms of procedural fairness. To some extent, this challenge is 
mitigated by the fact that many such administrators have better access to lower-level instruments 
which require procedural fairness in administrative action.  However, there are few of such rules 
and regulations, and where they exist, their coverage of principles of procedural fairness is 
incomplete. This the case with the Malawi Public Service Regulations and the Handbook, and 
more sector-related instruments such as the Decentralized Environmental Management 
Guidelines.  
 
The study identified a number of contextual factors that impede the effective incorporation of 
principles of administrative law into local government rulemaking and adjudication processes. 
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The first is the significant role played by informal processes and mechanisms in government 
rulemaking. The study established the existence of processes and mechanisms that make a 
significant contribution to rulemaking either parallel to, or in conjunction with, the formal ones. 
A good example which the study found was the process by which, in the implementation of their 
projects, some non-governmental organizations engage communities directly and establish rules 
that regulate the community members with respect to project-related activities. There is evidence 
from elsewhere which suggests that informal mechanisms can facilitate the contribution of 
administrative law to democratic governance because they facilitate the revision and updating of  
their rules outside of such formal requirements in a process labelled “dynamic rulemaking.”40 
The co-existence and interplay of formal and informal processes and mechanisms complicates 
the question of legality with respect to local government rulemaking and adjudication. This is 
particularly the case where formal processes recognize informal ones in practice despite the latter 
not having any identifiable legal basis. The case of Town Chiefs is an interesting exemplar in 
this regard. Town Though  not officially recognized by the law or vested with any legal powers, 
Town Chiefs undertake processes and establish mechanisms that generate rules which are 
regarded as binding by not only by the members themselves, but also officials of the formal local 
government structures. A 2009 study on Town Chiefs found that among the rules that they had 
generated were those pertaining to socio-cultural issues, such as funerals; land and property; 
socio-economic development; justice and order; and administration.41 
4. RULE APPLICATION  
This section presents and discusses the findings of the research pertaining to the application of 
rules by local government administrative agencies in Malawi. The analysis of the relevant data  
is informed by theories that identify the actors involved in the application of rules and the 
mechanisms and processes that they use as critical factors in determining whether administrative 
law impedes or facilitates governance in particular contexts. This section thus analyses and 
discusses the empirical findings of the study with specific reference to the actors, processes and 
mechanisms involved in the application of administrative rules in Malawian local government.  
The findings of the study are analysed in relation to the benchmarks of administrative law 
principles of legality, rationality and procedural fairness as applied in the context of rule 
application by local government actors in Malawi.  Implicit in the discussion is the 
acknowledgement that there are often overlaps between application and adjudication of rules.  
                                                          
40 Wagner et. al. Dynamic Rulemaking, Working Paper, University of Chicago Law School, available at 
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Broadly, the role of administrative agencies in the application of rules involves the interpretation 
and application of  rules as the basis for making decisions and taking particular actions in the 
exercise of their legal authority. In Malawian local government, the application of rules is 
undertaken mainly by three categories of actors:  local and central government officials, 
traditional authorities and  informal institutions. Local government officials derive their legal 
mandate to apply rules primarily from the Local Government Act which empowers Councils, on 
whose behalf they act, to apply rules in a wide range of areas, including revenue collection, 
environmental management, health and safety, the use of roads, building standards and  business 
and trade.42  Local government officials also derive their powers to apply rules from other 
statutes, for example, the Town and Country Planning Act which designates District, Municipal 
and City  Councils as Planning Committees with power to approve development plans for their 
respective  areas;43 the Public Health Act, which requires Councils to take measures to safeguard 
and promote public health in the areas of their jurisdiction;44 the Business Licensing Act, which 
mandates Councils to issue business licences in the areas of their jurisdictions on behalf of the 
Minister of Trade.45  
On its part, the legal mandate of local government level functionaries of central government 
ministries and departments to apply rules is derived primarily from  the Constitution, which vests 
in the executive branch of the government the responsibility to implement all laws.46  Based on 
this legal mandate, central government officials of Ministries operating at the district, city or 
municipality level undertake the application of rules that apply to their different sectors. Among 
such officials are   managers and officers who administer the remits of their respective  ministries 
and departments  at  district, municipal and city levels. Such  officials include District Education 
Managers, District Health Officers, District Water Development Officers, District Agriculture 
Development Officers, District Forestry Officers, District Environmental Health Officers, 
District Trade Officers, District Labour Officers, District Social Welfare Officers, District 
Information Officers and Officers-in-Charge of district police stations.   
On their part, traditional authorities play a significant role in rule application within local 
government areas in at least two capacities. First, in their own right, chiefs apply customary law 
rules in almost all aspects of life as an inherent aspect of their traditional authority.  The study 
found that the application of customary law rules by chiefs is sometimes characterised by 
uncertainty and contestation inherent which results from the difficulties of defining customary 
law and distinguishing it from non-binding traditional practices which are reified as customary 
                                                          
42 See Second Schedule to the Local Government Act. 
43 Sections 9 and 10, Town and Country Planning Act 
44 Section 7 of the Public Health Act. 
45 General Notice No. 77 of 1970 issued under section 7 of the Businesses Licensing Act. 
46 Section 7. 
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law by dominant social groups.  Notwithstanding the conceptual and doctrinal debates on the 
nature and scope of  customary law, the study identified a wide range of rules of customary law  
that are applied by chiefs and accepted as legally binding by their “subjects”  at local government 
level. In addition to applying rules of customary law in their own right, chiefs also apply 
statutory rules as agents of the local government by virtue of  the Chiefs  Act which mandates 
them   to  assist  in  the  general  administration  of  districts as the District Commissioner may 
require.47    
The third category of actors involved in rule application at the local government level in Malawi 
which was identified by the study were informal institutions such as voluntary organisations and 
“town chiefs” which are described above in the discussion on rulemaking. Organisations, such as 
market committees, taxi-owners’/drivers’ associations,  apply rules not only to their members but 
also some that directly affect the public. On their part, “town chiefs” apply rules that regulate 
different aspects of the lives of residents in the areas over which the “town chiefs” claim 
jurisdiction. As was mentioned earlier, though, the legal basis of town chiefs and voluntary 
organisations is, at best, contested and, at worst, non-existent. This is evidently antithetical to the 
promotion of the principle of legality and, by extension, democratic governance. 
Rationality 
The obligation of local government actors to comply with the administrative law principle of 
rationality in the application of rules is not only stated in the Constitution but has also received 
judicial emphasis.  
 
A number of findings emerged from the preceding identification of actors involved in the 
application of  rules and the scope of their legal mandates. The first, which resonates with the 
findings with respect to rulemaking and adjudication, is that there is a proliferation  of actors 
involved in rule-application which breeds jurisdictional overlaps and conflicts. This is 
exemplified in the relationship between the local government officials and chiefs. while the local 
government act empowers local government functionaries to apply rules to a wide range of 
subject matters, such as the areas of environmental management, health and safety, the use of 
roads, building standards and business and trade, for example, the language by which chiefs are 
granted powers under the Chiefs Act is broad enough to authorise them to apply rules of 
customary law in the same areas.  The implication of the multiplicity of actors which have the de 
jure or de facto power to apply rules results in variations in their interpretation and 
implementation  by the different agencies. This militates against the development of consistent 
standards of rationality in administrative rule application. The absence of such consistency 
undermines the capacity of administrative law to contribute to democratic governance based on 
equality before the law and non-doscrimination.  
                                                          
47 Chiefs Act, Section 7(d).  
30 
 
The second main finding on actors involved in rule application was that very few officials who 
are directly involved in the application of rules  possess the  requisite knowledge and skills to 
identify applicable rules, interpret them and implement them in accordance with administrative 
law principles which, among other things, require them to   understand the notions of 
“relevant/irrelevant considerations”, “proper/improper purposes”, “proportionality” and 
“rationality” as they apply to the exercise of discretionary powers.48 Except for District 
Commissioners of the country’s 28 districts and Chief Executive Officers of the three cities and 
one municipality that the country has and the Municipalities who have had formal training in 
administrative law, as was discussed with respect to rule-making,  the vast majority of actors 
involved in rule-application who were interviewed for this research confessed to having little or 
no knowledge of the prescriptions of the constitutional principles of administrative law. In 
practice, such actors determined the legality, rationality and procedural fairness of their 
administrative decisions and actions on the basis of their intuition and experience. A telling 
example of this approach is the “procedure” used in applying rules in cases of alleged 
indiscipline by local government officers, as was described by a senior local government official 
during this study.   According to the official, in such cases, "We do talk to the person before 
interdicting them. We write the person a warning letter and give him/ her counseling sessions. If 
the situation does not improve then the person is interdicted." The response is revealing in its 
lack of any reference to the requirements of procedural fairness, such as the official’s right to be 
heard or the need to avoid the appearance of bias. Also worthy of note was his inclusion of 
“counselling”, which is not part of the procedure prescribed by law.   
Procedural fairness 
As with all other institutions, local government actors have a constitutional obligation to observe 
procedural fairness in their administrative actions and decisions.49 In addition, a number of 
statutory provisions stipulate procedural fairness measures that apply to rule application 
scenarios. In this regard, it is worth noting that where  a Council   refuses to grant a  licence for 
the operation of a private market,  it is required to give reasons in writing for the refusal.50 It is, 
notable, however that specific legal provisions that set out particular functions of councils, 
including those involving the application of rules do not restate the obligation of procedural 
fairness. Thus, the Local Government Act does not expressly require the Council to observe 
procedural justice  in the following the rule-application scenarios:  demolition or closing of 
buildings deemed to be unfit for human habitation, prohibition or control the sale of any wares 
                                                          
48 For the significance of these concepts, see the landmark case of Associated Provincial Picture Houses v 
Wednesbury Corporation  [1948] 1 KB 223, whose conceptualization of these notions as elements of 
unreasonableness has been cited with approval in numerous Malawian cases including Kwame Phiri and 14 others v 
Minister of State in the President’s Office Civil Cause No. 60 Of 1997, Nyirenda v Attorney General Miscellaneous 
Civil Cause No. 33 Of 1996, Du Chisiza jnr v Minister of Education , Miscellaneous Civil Cause No. 10 Of 1993;  
Ex Parte Zaibula and Council of the University of Malawi Civil Cause No. 34 Of 1997; Mchawi v Minister of 
Education, Science  and Technology Miscellaneous Civil Cause No. 82 Of 1997. 
49 The Constitution of the Republic of Malawi, section 43. 
50 Paragraph 7(2), Second Schedule, Local Government Act. 
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on any street or any public place for the purpose of carrying out any trade, business or 
profession, the levying of fees for services, the prohibition of the playing of music or the use of 
any loudspeaker or amplifier for advertising purposes in any public place.51 
The study also found that the application of rules was often contrary to principles of fairness 
which underlie administrative law. Two case studies demonstrate an apparently discriminatory 
approach to rule application. The first case relates to the differentiation between informal traders 
and formal traders in relation to the application of by-laws. In successive “sweeping exercises,” 
all the country’s city councils have strictly applied by-laws regulating street trading and evicted 
informal street traders from the cities’ streets. At least two attempts by associations of street 
vendors to use judicial review to stop the councils from implementing the evictions were 
successfully challenged by the latter.52 Currently vendors who trade on the streets are liable to be 
arrested and, in some cases, prosecuted.53 In contrast, formal traders using buildings that were 
found to be in violation of Blantyre City by-laws as long ago as 1996 continue to do so despite 
occasional threats by the council to demolish the buildings. An injunction obtained by the traders 
in January 2016 remains unchallenged by the council for various legal reasons,54 although some 
experts have argued that the Council has enough legal tools to enforce the law against the 
property owners.55 It is estimated that Blantyre City has over 160 buildings whose demolition is 
overdue.56 
The perceived bias of Blantyre City Council in the application of its by-laws is not the only 
instance of breach of the administrative law principle of fairness that the study found. In at least 
three other well-documented cases, the city councils of Lilongwe and Blantyre have in the past 
failed to enforce development control by-laws and permitted the construction of buildings in 
areas in which such buildings were permitted. In two of the prominent cases, property 
development which violated city zoning regulations was condoned by city councils allegedly 
because the developers had political connections. 
                                                          
51 Schedule 2, Local Government Act. 
52 See Lilongwe Street Vendors Association v Lilongwe City Assembly (Civil Case No 618 of 2006) ((Civil Case No 
618 Of 2006)) [2006] MWHC 98 (09 May 2006). 
53 See “Malawi police clash with recalcitrant vendors” available at  http://www.panapress.com/Malawi-police-clash-
with-recalcitrant-vendors--13-580913-17-lang1-index.html, accessed on 1 August 2016; Malawi: Govt destroys 
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54 See “Malawi ‘Red Star’ campaign hits a snag, landowners obtain court order” available at 
http://www.nyasatimes.com/malawi-red-star-campaign-hits-a-snag-landowners-obtain-court-order/.  
55 For example, see “Blantyre ‘Red Star’ campaign hits snag” available at http://timesmediamw.com/blantyre-red-
star-campaign-hits-snag/, accessed on 2 August 2016 in which a University of Malawi Associate Professor of Law 
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from the Lands Act there are also the Town and Country Planning Act and the Local Government Act that give the 
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56 See “BCC shifting goal posts on red star campaign’ available at 
http://www.capitalradiomalawi.com/component/k2/item/4919-bcc-shifting-goal-posts-on-red-star-campaign, 
accessed on 1 September 2016. 
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As mentioned earlier, another category of actors who  play a significant role in local government 
administration consists of chiefs, who are also referred to as traditional leaders and draw their 
mandate from both legislation and customary law. In the discharge of their functions, traditional 
leaders routinely apply various rules, including council by-laws and rules of customary law. 
Historical evidence reviewed during the study suggested that in their application of by-laws, 
chiefs do not use any shared set of standards of interpreting and applying specific by-laws, but 
rely on their individual traditional knowledge and skills. Constitutional principles of 
administrative justice do not feature in any of their experiences of applying by-laws and other 
rules. Given that chiefs are appointed by virtue of blood relation and do not require a 
professional qualification in administration, they can gain knowledge of the administrative law 
principles of legality, rationality and procedural fairness and their applicability to local 
government rule-application by  
4.2 Processes and mechanisms 
In general, Malawian law establishes processes and mechanisms that are intended to ensure 
compliance with the principles of legality, rationality and procedural fairness in the application 
of rules. The Constitution guarantees every person the human right to lawful and procedurally 
fair administration action and to reasons in writing for adverse administrative action.57 Courts 
have also on numerous occasions confirmed the obligation of administrative decision-makers to 
ensure that processes and mechanisms they use in the application of rules comply with principles 
of administrative law.58 A number of particular processes and mechanisms for rule-application 
also stipulate compliance with principles of administrative law. For example, section 68(5) of the 
Town and country Planning Act provides that the High Court may quash a decision of a Planning 
Board if it discloses  an error of law or a failure to comply with procedural requirements. 
With respect to the application of formal rules such as legislation and by-laws, the study found 
that consistency in the application of rules was undermined by   the fact that, in addition to 
interpreting the laws, which are written in English, decision-makers often have to translate them 
into local languages in applying them to factual situations. In the absence of standard guidelines 
to assist officials and other actors who are mandated apply rules in their translation of rules into 
local languages, the matter is left to the discretion of individual officials and actors, with the 
result that the interpretation, and thus application of rules varies from place to place. The 
situation is compounded by the fact that in many cases, local government officials are not 
required to be native speakers of the language of the area in which they operate. Thus the task, in 
the application of rules, will often involve an official translating between two languages, neither 
of which is his or her first language.   
                                                          
57 The Constitution, section 43.  
58 See the cases of: Limbe Town Council v Kirkcaldy 1 ALR(Malawi) 133 in which the High Court stated that by-
laws must be reasonable; The State v Blantyre City Assembly, ex.p. Ngwala Miscellaneous Civil Application No.183 
of 2012 in which the High Court quashed a purported application of a by-law empowering the council to control and 
prohibit public nuisances partly on the ground that the council had not given affected parties the right to be heard. 
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Another finding on the application and enforcement of rules  by local government-level actors is 
that the processes are either not documented at all or are documented only partially. This 
particularly the case with the application of rules by informal institutions such as market 
committees and ‘town chiefs” whose decisions and actions are not recorded systematically in 
writing. In contrast, formal actors such as council staff do keep written records of their 
application of rules in the form of memoranda, letters, minutes of meetings and activity reports. 
However, the study found that the archiving of such records, where they exist, is largely 
unsatisfactory as most councils lack the basic facilities for systematic and comprehensive record-
keeping. This makes it difficult to determine whether, in particular instances of rule application, 
actors complied with norms of legality, rationality and procedural fairness. It also militates 
against the maintenance of a system of precedents which would assist decision-makers  in 
maintaining consistency in their application of rules, thereby, promoting the administrative law 
principle of fairness.  
5.   ADJUDICATION. 
The study identified the actors, processes and mechanisms involved in administrative 
adjudication in Malawian local government, and investigated their compliance with 
administrative law principles of legality, rationality and procedural fairness. One broad definition 
of adjudication is that it is “the entire system for resolving individualized disputes between 
private parties and government administrative agencies, starting with an administrative 
investigation and the  agency’s preliminary or “frontline” decision continuing through the 
process by which a private party challenges the frontline decision, and concluding with judicial 
review.” For the purposes of this study, however, the primary focus is on “adjudication” 
undertaken  by administrative agencies and their officials, although that undertaken by the courts 
in judicial review was also investigated, albeit only with respect to its impact on the former.  
The study conceptualized “adjudication” as   acts that involve the admission of evidence, its 
analysis and assessment, based on prescribed norms, and the issuing of an order which may be 
affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory. The study also took an expansive view of 
“administrative agencies” and did not strictly confine the term to functionaries of formal 
government structures but included, in the term, formal and hybrid institutions, whose 
adjudicative activities have a significant effect on the enjoyment of the right to administrative 
justice by citizens. In the context of Malawi, including the formal and hybrid institutions in a 
broadened definition of “administrative agencies” for purposes of this study is further justified 
by the fact that under the Constitution, human rights guarantees have both a horizontal and 
vertical application.  
5.1 Actors 
Informed by the preceding conceptual view of adjudication, the study inquired into the normative 
and empirical reality which constitute administrative adjudication in local government in 
Malawi. From the inquiry, the study made four main findings that have implications for the 
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potential of administrative law to contribute to democratic governance. The first was that  
adjudication of matters at local government level in Malawi is undertaken by a multiplicity of 
actors who may be classified into three categories,  the first of which consists of formal local 
government actors, the most active of which were found to include District Commissioners and 
Chief Executive Officers of cities and municipalities,  Town and Country Planning Boards and 
Plot Allocation Committees.”   With respect to the principle of legality, the study established that 
the respective adjudicative mandates of each of the said formal local government actors are 
clearly provided for in the law, either implicitly or explicitly. In the case of District 
Commissioners and city and municipal Chief Executive Officers, the Local Government Act 
mandates them to be responsible for implementing the resolutions of the Council, the day to day 
performance of the executive and administrative functions of the Council, the supervision of the 
departments of the Council, and the proper management and discipline of the staff of the 
Council.   These responsibilities necessarily involve some degree of   adjudication. On their part,  
Town and Country Planning Boards  are empowered by section 67 of the Town and Country 
Planning Act to hear appeals against decisions of Planning Committees relating to approvals or 
rejections of development plans, while   Plot Allocation Committees   are empowered to “hear 
and settle plot disputes in Townships and Improvement Areas.”59     
The second category of actors who exercise adjudicatory powers at local government level 
consists of Chiefs who exercise adjudicative powers derived from customary law, with license 
from the Chiefs Act, which empowers Chiefs “to carry out the traditional functions of his office 
under customary law.”  Under virtually all customary laws in Malawi, adjudication is one of the 
most significant areas of any chief’s mandate and authority.  The study, however,   focussed only 
on  adjudication by chiefs that related to administrative rules and excluded the broader 
adjudicative authority of chiefs which is quasi-judicial in nature. In this vein, the study regarded 
chiefs as administrative adjudicators mainly with respect to the adjudication of disputes related 
to by-laws. 
The third category of adjudicative actors at local government level consists of various informal 
actors, including “town chiefs,” who exercise such power notwithstanding the lack of any 
specific statutory authority.   
5.2 Processes and mechanisms 
The study found that the Constitution and a number of statues clearly stipulate the norms with 
which all actors engaged in adjudication must comply. The most authoritative of such provisions 
is section 43 of the Constitution which guarantees every person the right to: lawful and 
procedurally fair administrative action, which is justifiable in relation to reasons given where his 
or her rights, freedoms, legitimate expectations or interests are affected or threatened and the 
right to be furnished with reasons, in writing, for administrative action where his or her rights, 
                                                          




freedoms, legitimate expectations or interests are affected. The duty of administrative decision-
makers to act lawfully and to be procedurally fair is also stipulated in a number of statutory 
provisions that provide for adjudication at the local government level. An example of such a 
provision is section 7(b) of the Chiefs Act which empowers chiefs to carry out the traditional 
functions of their office under customary law provided that the discharge of such functions is, 
among other things, “ not repugnant to natural justice.”  
The duty of administrative decision-makers to uphold legality, reasonableness and procedural 
fairness is also reinforced by a long line of judicial authorities which have enforced the duty 
against actors performing adjudicative functions in  local government, among other sectors. In 
their various judgments, the courts have underscored the importance of administrative law 
principles in promoting democratic governance. Some   quotations from a few of the notable 
High Court judgments   are presented in Box 4.  
On its part, subsidiary legislation under the Town and Country Planning Act also requires 
compliance with procedural fairness in  the exercise of adjudicatory powers. Rules 7 to 18 of the 
Town and Country Planning Board Rules include provisions which  require the Board when 
seized of an appeal to, among other things, send to the appellant and respondent  not less than 
fourteen days’ notice of the place and date of the hearing of the appeal; permit parties to appear 
either in person or through a representative, including a legal practitioner;  to call witnesses; to 
allow them to be  subjected to cross-examination and re-examination at the hearing of the appeal; 
to hold the hearings in public; and to record its decisions in writing.  
The study identified a number of factors that impede compliance with administrative law in the 
exercise of adjudicative powers. . The first is the multiplicity of formal and informal actors who 
participate in adjudication at local government level. This situation creates uncertainty in the 
respective roles that the various actors are entitled to play, especially in the absence of rules to 
resolve cases of jurisdictional overlaps and conflicts. It also makes it difficult to attain 
consistency  in the interpretation of rules and their application to factual situations.  Members of 
the public appear to be aware that there are differences in the quality of adjudication dispensed 
by different adjudicating authorities, as is evidenced by the incidence of forum shopping which 
is undertaken in search of a preferred decision-maker.  
The differences in the appreciation of the legal standards of administrative justice among 
different adjudicators is compounded by the varying levels of knowledge of constitutional 
standards of administrative justice both among different decision-makers within the same 
institution and between different institutions. As noted in the discussion of rule making and 
application, formal knowledge of principles of administrative law is limited to a few senior 
officials of councils, while the vast majority of decision-makers lack such knowledge although 
they routinely undertake adjudicative tasks and, in the process, exercise wide discretionary 
powers. In this respect, it is important to note that the law governing adjudication at local 
government level does not stipulate knowledge or experience of principles of administrative 
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justice as a condition for qualifying to exercise adjudicative powers. This is the case with some 
of the most significant adjudicators at local government level, including Chiefs whose only 
qualifying criteria is that they must be entitled to chieftaincy under customary law. The other 
adjudicative institution whose members are not required to have knowledge of administrative 
law is Town and Country Boards whose members are appointed by the Minister under the Town 
and Country Planning Act. In appointing individuals to the Board, the Minister is required to 
take into account the desirability of having members of the Board who have knowledge and 
experience  in town and country planning, land management and valuation, economics, law, civil 
engineering, surveying, housing, architecture and social welfare.  Although “law” is included in 
the competencies, it is stated too broadly to ensure that the appointee will have specific 
knowledge and experience of administrative law.  
The finding in the preceding paragraph gains added significance in light of the fact that the vast 
majority of local government councils and town and country planning boards in Malawi  cannot 
afford to engage legal counsel who can advise them on the application of the principles of 
legality, rationality and procedural fairness in the adjudication of cases.  At the time of the 
collection of data for this study, only two- City of Blantyre and City of Lilongwe- out of the 
thirty-two local government councils had an in-house lawyer. The rest use either private law 
firms to provide advice in individual cases or rely on the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional 
Affairs (MJCA) to provide them advice in reaction to particular circumstances. Private lawyers 
and lawyers from the MJCA are largely reactive in their engagement with the agencies that seek 
their advice, while an in-house lawyer is largely proactive. Since in-house lawyers are embedded 
in their agencies, they also have  more  opportunities than private or MOJC  lawyers have, to 
proactively and continually influence their agencies to apply administrative law principles in 
adjudication 
Another finding of the study with respect to adjudication was that procedures for adjudication in 
a significant majority of cases are ad hoc, reflect  the combined use of formal and informal 
institutions and are characterised by the blurring of boundaries between adjudication and other 
forms of conflict management processes such as mediation and negotiation. The ad hoc nature of 
many adjudication interventions was evident in the establishment of ad hoc committees to 
undertake adjudication of particular matters, as was reported in Mwanza District Council; the 
absence of any written procedures for adjudication by lower level decision-makers such as 
Market Masters; the lack of any rules regarding qualifications of people who participate in the 
adjudication. 
In virtually all the study areas, the study found that adjudication of disputes between the Council 
and ratepayers were addressed by a combination of formal and informal institutions, including 
mediation by chiefs and non-governmental organisations and adjudication by the Chief 
Executive Officer and other technical officials of the municipality. Unsurprisingly, almost all 
respondents interviewed for the study were unable to distinguish between adjudication, strictly 
so-called, and other forms of conflict management and resolution, let alone to identify the 
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constitutional and statutory principles and rules of administrative law with which officials 
undertaking adjudication must comply. Consequently, many decision-makers interviewed for the 
study relied on their intuition and invoked wide discretionary powers in deciding cases, except 
where the law that granted them power was prescriptive in both the procedures to be applied and 
the principles of legality, rationality and procedural fairness to be applied.   
The other situations in which decision-makers demonstrated a more informed appreciation of the 
nature  of adjudication and the norms which apply to it were those in which the decision-makers 
had reasonable access to legal advice. In this regard, the study found that the retention of in-
house legal counsel by administrative agencies, as was the case with the Lilongwe and Blantyre 
City Councils improved their awareness of the norms of legality, rationality and procedural 
fairness. However, the study found that such awareness did not necessarily translate into 
adjudicative decisions that complied with administrative law principles. Many respondents 
reported that the most significant factors that constrain compliance were financial cost 
considerations and political pressure.   
5.3 The impact of judicial review 
As stated earlier, in the context of the study, “adjudication” was also used with reference to that 
undertaken by the courts, especially in the form of judicial review of administrative action. Of 
particular interest to the study was the impact of judicial review on the actions and decisions by 
administrative agencies and officials. In investigating such impact, if any, the researcher 
interviewed a sample of local government level decision-makers with a view to establishing 
whether, and to what extent, judicial review incentivized them towards compliance with 
principles of administrative law.   
The study was predicated on the widely-held view that  judicial review can have a direct impact 
on the quality of administrative rulemaking and adjudication.60 Administrators who are subjected 
to judicial review are likely to be influenced by their experience and, in future decisions and 
actions, are likely to be aware of the principles of administrative law and the consequences of not 
complying with them.  At the same time, other administrators who are aware of the judicial 
review of the decisions and actions of their peers may also be encouraged to comply with 
principles of administrative law laid down by the courts in order to protect their own decisions 
and actions from the risk of nullification through judicial review. For purposes of investigating 
the role of judicial review in this context, the study sought to answer the following questions: 
Does judicial review facilitate the democratic and accountable exercise of power by 
administrative agencies and local authorities? How does judicial review transform patterns of 
bureaucratic behavior?  Do administrative agencies obey or implement judicial review decisions?  
Further, do they review their decision making procedures where they have been faulted by courts 
in judicial review proceedings?  And does judicial review have an educative effect? In order to 
answer the questions,   the researchers  collected and analysed qualitative data on the nature of 
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judicial review in Malawi and its impact on administrative rulemaking, rule application and 
adjudication in the setting of local government in Malawi, and came up with the findings 
discussed below. 
 The study found that in Malawi, administrative decisions of public bodies may be subjected to 
judicial scrutiny in at least three types of circumstances. The first is where courts adjudicate   
disputes which revolve around  questions of private rights such as contract and torts. Even if the 
breach of a contract is essentially the result of the decision of a public body, the matter is 
adjudicated as a private law issue. The second circumstance in which a court may scrutinize the 
decision of a public official is where the court is granted appeal powers in particular 
administrative processes. The High Court has such powers under the Parliamentary and 
Presidential Elections Act, the Town  . The third form of judicial scrutiny is judicial review 
which seeks to review the lawfulness of the administrative decision and not its merits.  
 
The study found that the legal framework is unequivocal in its provision for judicial review of 
administrative action. The Constitution expressly empower  the High Court to  “review any law, 
and any action or decision of the Government, for conformity with this Constitution ….61” 
Conformity with the Constitution includes compliance with the constitutional provisions which 
entitle every person to administrative justice.62 Judicial review, in fact, predates the Constitution 
because it has  been part of the law of Malawian law ever since Malawi became a British 
Protectorate and imposed colonial law to the territory. That law included the common law, which 
included judicial review of administrative action. In addition to the Constitution, judicial review 
in Malawi is also anchored in the common law. 
 
The study established that there is a   body of case law which indicates that judicial review has 
been used to promote and enforce administrative principles of legality, rationality and procedural 
fairness in  local government rulemaking, rule application and adjudication. Before discussing 
specific findings on the cases, it is important to note the apparent correlation between the 
frequency of judicial review applications and the nature of decision-makers who are challenged 
through it, on the one hand, and the degree of liberalization of the broader political environment. 
Thus, it has been demonstrated that the political liberalization that accompanied the transition 
from a one-party authoritarian political system to a multiparty democracy in the early 1990s 
resulted in the  increased use of judicial review as a mechanism to control the exercise of public 
power.63     
 
On the nature and character of judicial review itself, the study made at least four main findings . 
The first is that judicial review is used much less frequently that other forms of judicial processes 
                                                          
61 Section 108(2). 
62 Section 43. 
63 Nzunda, Matembo. "The quickening of judicial control of administrative action in Malawi 1992-1994." In Phiri, 
Kings Mbacazwa, and Kenneth R. Ross, eds. Democratization in Malawi: A stocktaking. No. 4. Christian Literature 
Association in Malawi, 1998.  
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to challenge decisions and actions of local government authorities. In all reported cases in the 
period between 1990 and 1997  in which local councils were parties, for example, only in less 
than five percent were decisions of local government officials challenged through judicial 
review. Similarly the vast majority of cases in a sample of  over fifty   cases reported in the 
Malawi Law Reports in which one of the parties was a district, city, municipal or town council or 
assembly, the overwhelming number involved causes of action based on the enforcement of 
private rights, and not judicial review aimed at enforcing public duties. A related finding was 
that the delineation of public and private law rights by Malawian courts for purposes of judicial 
review reflects some of the uncertainty that has historically dogged judicial review doctrine.64 A 
case in point is Makono v Lilongwe City Council65 whose facts included plausible evidence that 
services of the the plaintiff as a Deputy Town Clerk for Lilongwe City Council, had been 
terminated by the City Council following a directive issued by the President of the Republic. In 
terminating the plaintiff’s employment, the Council did not cite the presidential directive but 
referred to other grounds for their decision. Despite strong circumstantial evidence indicating 
that the Council’s decision effectively amounted to the public law issue of abdication of 
discretion on its part, the court preferred to proceed with the matter  as one involving private law 
rights involving contract law.66   
The second main finding in this part of the study was that judicial review has limited impact on 
administrative decision-makers’ preference for legality, rationality and procedural fairness in 
rulemaking, rule application and adjudication by local government actors in Malawi. The 
evidence suggested at least two factors that account for this state of affairs.  The first relates to 
challenges in access to public information.  Many administrative decision-makers are unaware of  
of particular cases of judicial review and the principles that the cases prescribe because they 
cannot easily access copies of judgments of the courts. This state of affairs was largely due to the 
limited publication of judgments by the judiciary. Capacity constraints of the judiciary prevent 
them from establishing a system for publishing all reports regularly and comprehensively.67 
                                                          
64 For the classic common law  exposition of the doctrine, see the case of O'Reilly v Mackman [1983] 2 AC 237. 
debates on the history and current challenges of the public/private divide, see Bamforth, N. 1993. ‘The scope of 
Judicial Review- Still Uncertain?’, Public Law, 239-248; Mwanza, Mandhlase. "The Public/Private Divide: An 
Outdated Concept Of Governance In English Law." Diffusion-The UCLan Journal of Undergraduate Research 6.1 
(2013). 
65 Makono v Lilongwe City Council [1999] MLR 147.  
66 Also see the case of Chatsika v Blantyre City Assembly [2005] MLR 34 in which the High Court dismissed an 
application for leave for judicial review on the ground that although the action complained of had been done by a 
public body, the subject matter of the case before the court was the private law enforcement of a contract. Also see 
Nyasaland Electricity Supply Commission v Blantyre Municipality [1961-63] African Law Reports (Malawi) 306 in 
which despite formally being an appeal against  rating valuation, the case was substantially about whether the 
Municipality had taken into account irrelevant considerations or had  failed to take into account relevant 
considerations in the exercise of its statutory valuation powers under the Town and Country Planning Ordinance. 
Further see the case of Mzuzu City Assembly v Chitete Civil Appeal No.26 of 2007 in which the Supreme Court of 
Appeal treated damage to property occasioned as a result of the breach of a statutory duty by Mzuzu City   as a 
private law matter although, in the words of the court “the basis of the respondent’s claim therefore was the 
illegality [of the exercise] of a public dutyand to that end ideally a ground for judicial review.” 
67 The limited accessibility of legal information is discussed  
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There is also no system for distributing judgments and rulings, even among public institutions. 
On their part local government actors interviewed for the study did not appear to consider the 
accessing of information on judicial review to be a priority. As it happens, therefore, it is only 
actors who have had personal experience of judicial review proceedings   who displayed some 
awareness of the judicial prescriptions of administrative law principles, although even in those 
exceptional cases, the knowledge was limited to that of the cases in which they had participated 
directly. The only cases in which decision-makers had the means to improve their awareness of 
judicial review practices if they were so minded were those in which the decision-makers had 
legal counsel. This is current the case with only two of the country’s local government councils, 
namely Blantyre City Council and Lilongwe City Council, which can afford to employ in-house 
lawyers.68 
In the limited number of cases in which    decision-makers demonstrated awareness of judicial 
review and the standards of administrative decision-making that they prescribe, their willingness 
to translate that awareness into practice  was impeded by  more compelling considerations which 
overrode the imperative to be comply with administrative law principles enunciated by the 
courts. The study   found that, for the majority of decision-makers, the prospect of judicial 
review was a less weighty consideration in decision-making than the risk of incurring the 
disapproval of powerful local and national politicians. Given a choice between following judicial 
prescriptions and offending powerful political forces or pleasing the politician and disregarding 
the dictates of the judiciary, many respondents identified the former as a more pragmatic choice. 
In any case, many respondents considered the probability of being subjected to judicial review 
for violation of administrative law principles to be much lower than that of being victimized by 
politicians disgruntled with their decisions. The fear of political victimization is made more real 
by reported cases of public officials who have been transferred from their duty stations on the 
demand of politicians whom they offended, sometimes by insisting of strict application of 
rules.69   
7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. 
The conclusions of the study are presented below in correspondence to the research questions of 
the study.  
(a) The map of administrative agencies in Malawian local government reveals that 
rulemaking, rule-application and administrative adjudication are undertaken by a proliferation of 
formal and informal institutions. The   interrelationships among the institutions are characterized 
by  a significant degree of jurisdictional overlaps and conflicts which are caused largely by a 
                                                          
68 Interview, Blantyre City Council Chief Executive. 
69 Chiweza, Asiyati, “The Political Economy of Local Governance in Malawi”, available at 
http://tilitonsefund.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/The-Political-Economy-of-Local-Governance-in-Malawi-
2011.pdf, accessed 10 July 2016. 
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legal framework that is largely sound but nevertheless has gaps, ambiguities, unclear provisions 
and no principles to reconcile customary and state law.   
(b) There is wide variation among agencies with respect to the legal basis for their 
rulemaking, rule application and adjudication. The agencies  range from those whose legal 
mandates are unambiguous to those which appear to act without any legal mandate at all. In the 
case of the latter, a number of institutions that play an important social role are permitted to 
operate notwithstanding the absence of legal mandates based on their legitimacy with the public 
or necessity, although with respect to the latter, judicial opinion appears to be divided. 
  
(c) Although the Malawian legal framework establishes mechanisms and process that have 
the potential to facilitate effective public participation in rule making, rule application and 
adjudication processes of administrative agencies and local authorities, in practice such 
participation is limited due to a number of factors including limited access to information by the 
public, the unduly technical nature of some of the decisions in which the public is invited to 
participate, language barriers that are created by the fact that the majority of Malawians are not 
literate in English, which is the country’s official language. 
 (d) The vast majority of members of the public have little or no awareness of the rule 
making, rule application and adjudication processes that are used by the formal structures of 
local government in Malawi, such as city and district councils. Consequently very few members 
of the public directly use the mechanisms. A majority of individuals and community 
organisations are more conversant with the rule making, rule application and adjudication 
processes that are used by informal local government institutions, such as town chiefs and 
voluntary organisations. In general, the public does not consider the procedures and mechanisms 
used by city and district councils  to be fair mechanism for accountability that can contribute to 
the democratic exercise of power because, in their view, councilors, who are supposed to be their 
primary representatives on councils  are more accountable to their political parties than they are 
to the constituents. This appears to be because, unlike the latter, the former have sanctions which 
they can impose on councilors who do not serve their interests. 
(e) Judicial review does facilitate the democratic and accountable exercise of power by 
administrative agencies and local authorities as is evident by the cases in which courts enforced 
against local councils the obligation to act consistently with the requirements of legality, 
rationality and procedural fairness. Councils and other local government actors who are the 
subject of judicial review orders, appear to obey them and use them to review their procedures, 
although the application of such procedures is often impede by political considerations.   
(f) Other   institutions, processes and practical realities have a very significant influence on 
the democratic and accountable exercise of power by local government actors involved in 
rulemaking, rule application and adjudication. The most significant of such external influences 
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are those exerted by the Executive branch of government, which has the legal power to appoint 
and discipline the highest ranking bureaucrats in city and municipal councils, and to use political  
pressure to incentivize bureaucrats away from democratic and accountable practices. 
 
In light of the conclusions summarized above, the study makes the following recommendations:  
1.  The Law Commission, in consultation with local government councils, the Ombudsman, 
the Ministry of Justice and the judiciary, must undertake a comprehensive and systematic review 
of  all laws that set up and govern the institutional framework for rulemaking, rule-application 
and adjudication at local government level  in order to remove the jurisdictional overlaps and 
conflicts that result from the prevailing institutional proliferation.  
 
2. Parliament must amend the Local Government Act in order to improve  the insulation of 
public officials from political interference, for example, by expressly guaranteeing local 
government officials security of tenure, stipulating penal sanctions against any person or 
institution which induces a duly mandated public official to act contrary to the requirements of 
legality, rationality and procedural fairness. The third is to build the capacity of actors who are 
mandated to enforce laws and provide them incentives to motivate them to perform their 
functions and end the impunity which appears to characterize local government administration in 
which many actors continue to act without the necessary legal mandates  or in blatant violation 
of clear rules. 
 
3. The curricula for the training of lawyers in administrative law must be improved by 
revising learning outcomes to include deepened knowledge and understanding of the linkages 
between administrative law, constitutionalism and democratic governance and expanded     
appreciation of the political, social and economic forces which counterweigh principles of 
administrative law in influencing administrative decision-making.  
 
4. There must also be a substantial material investment in systems for information-sharing, 
both within and across institutions, with a view to improving the accessibility of court 
judgments, legislation, by-laws and other legal resources which are essential for the development 
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Annex 1: List of people interviewed 
Munthali-Ngwira, Thokozile  Ag. Director, Planning and Development.  Luchenza Municipal Council 
Nandolo, Ted   Chief Executive Officer, Blantyre City Council 
Nkhoma, Abubakar    Chief Executive Officer, Luchenza Municipal Council 
Rapozo,    District Commissioner, Mwanza District Council 
















1 – Dedza 
2 – Dowa 
3 – Kasungu 
4 – Lilongwe 
5 – Mchinji 
6 – Nkhotakota 
7 – Ntcheu 
8 – Ntchisi 
9 – Salima 
Northern Region 
10 – Chitipa 
11 – Karonga 
12 – Likoma 
13 – Mzimba 
14 – Nkhata Bay 
15 – Rumphi 
Southern Region 
16 – Balaka 
17 – Blantyre 
18 – Chikwawa 
19 – Chiradzulu 
20 – Machinga 
21 – Mangochi 
22 – Mulanje 
23 – Mwanza 
24 – Nsanje 
25 – Thyolo 
26 – Phalombe 




Annex 3: Local Government Councils by population 
Note: delayed filling of table due to current inaccessibility of National Statistical Office database 
Local government authority Projected Population (2019) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
